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PERCEIVED CIRCUMSTANCES, INFERENCES OF INTENT
AND JUDGMENTS OF OFFENSE SERIOUSNESS
MARC RIEDEL*
INTRODUCTION
The attempt by Sellin and Wolfgang" to
provide a more objective and reliable measure
of the amount and relative seriousness of of-
fenses can be viewed as a response to the
problems and issues in two areas in criminol-
ogy. First, as a system of collecting, classify-
ing and presenting data on crime, the Uniform
Crime Reports have been criticized for their
deficiences as early as 1931. In that year Sam
Bass Warner criticized the practice of substi-
tuting assaults and larceny for robbery in the
reporting of crimes and concluded that it
would be far better to have no statistics than
the false and biased statistics represented by
the Uniform Crime Reports.2 More recent cri-
tiques,3 and studies of hidden delinquency 4 and
criminal victimization. have made it clear that
improved methods of gathering data on crime
are needed.
While the Sellin-Wolfgang index provided
more useful criteria for gathering information
on crime by focusing on the delinquent event
rather than a legal label as the unit of data
*Project Director, Center for Studies in Crimi-
nology and Criminal Law, University of Penn-
sylvania.
This article is a revised version of M. Riedel,
The Perception of Crime: A Study of the Sellin-
Wolfgang Seriousness Index, 1972 (unpublished
dissertation in University of Pennsylvania Li-
brary). Portions of this paper were reported in
IMAGES OF CRME (T. Thornberry and E. Sagarin
eds. 1972).
1 T. SELuIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASURE-
MENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964) [hereinafter cited
as SELLIN & WOLFGANG].2 Wolfgang, Uniforn Crime Reports: A Critical
Appraisal, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 708 (1963) [herein-
after cited as Wolfgang].
a Kamisar, How to Use, Abuse-and Fight
Backwith-Crime Statistics, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 239
(1972); Robinson, A Critical View of the Uni-
form Crime Reports, 64 MIcH. L. Rv. 1031
(1966) ; Wolfgang, supra note 2.
4 M. GOLD, CRIME IN AN AMERICAN CITY
(1970).
5 Ennis, Crimnes, Victims and the Police, 4
TRANSACTION 36 (1967).
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collection, for example, the most innovative as-
pect of the index research was the development
of an empirical measure of offense seriousness.
In considering offense seriousness, a second
important issue concerns the manner in which
nonoffenders view the criminal act, what this
means for the processing of the criminal in the
legal system, and how the nonoffender's views
of the criminal act may create and reinforce a
deviant role. Whether we consider less well
known theories about economic and social
structural determinants of the social reactions
to crime0 or more contemporary versions of la-
belling theory,7 a measure of seriousness is im-
portant in testing and refining these theories.
The point of departure for this paper turns
on a problem which is relevant to the Sellin-
Wolfgang index both as a potential social indi-
cator and an empirical referent of theoretical
terms. The original Measurement of Delin-
quency8 and many of the subsequent replica-
tions emphasized the methodological prob-
lems involved in constructing and using such
an index; there has been little attempt to un-
derstand what cognitive processes cause judg-
ments of seriousness to be made. What is uti-
lized in making seriousness judgments in
addition to, or instead of, amounts of injury,
theft, or damage? It is, of course, useful to
know whether members of other cultures, so-
cial classes or statuses differ or agree in their
judgments of seriousness. But once we have
learned that individuals make certain judg-
ments about the seriousness of a given crime,
we still would like to know how they make
these judgments.
6 S. RANULF, MORAL INDIGNATION AND MIDDLE
CLASS PSYCHOLOGY (1964); G. RUSCHE & 0.
KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE (1939).
7 H. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCI-
OLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963); E. LEMERT, HUMAN
DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL CONTROL
(1967); E. LEMERr, SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1951).
8 SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 1.
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Drawing a theoretical orientation from so-
cial psychological theory, the purpose of this
paper is to explore what effect differing per-
ceptions of circumstances of the crime have
on seriousness judgements. The problem is
prompted by the conclusions of the original re-
search that judgments of seriousness reflect a
broad value consensus about the nature of
crime. If seriousness judgments reflect a reac-
tion to the violative act and a response to the
affront to agreed upon values, then the differ-
ing circumstances of the crime and inferences
of intent would seem to be of secondary impor-
tance in making a judgment about -the seri-
ousness of a given crime. Where the latter is
true, the results of the analysis should conform
to the replication criteria given by Sellin and
Wolfgang. Conversely, where differing circum-
stances lead to differences in judgments, the
results of the analysis should not be expected
to conform to replication criteria.
THE SERIOUSNESS INDEX AND REPLICATION
CRITERIA
Because a description of the development of
the seriousness index is given by other papers
in this symposium, it will suffice to indicate that
judgments of the seriousness of crimes do not
seem to be influenced by the age of the of-
fender. Sellin and Wolfgang asked raters to
rate the same offenses according to whether
the offender was aged thirteen, seventeen,
twenty-seven, or an unspecified number of years.
From the analysis of all ratings, the authors
concluded:
The most strongly supported conclusion on
the basis of the data at hand is that all the
raters, although unconstrained in their use of
the magnitude scale assignments, tended to so
assign the magnitude estimations that the seri-
ousness of the crimes is evaluated in a similar
way, without significant differences, by all the
groups. The age of the offender does not par-
ticularly color a person's judgment about the
seriousness of the offense. A pervasive social
agreement about what is serious and what is
not appears to emerge, and this agreement
transcends simple qualitative concordance; it
extends to the estimated numerical degree of
seriousness of these offenses.9
9Id. at 268.
In the present study we have interpreted the
two replication criteria given by Sellin and
Wolfgang in the following way. First, the re-
gression coefficient or slope of any two groups
under comparison should be close to 1.00,
which indicates that the two groups under
comparison agree in the judgments of serious-
ness. If one group perceives greater or lesser
increases in seriousness, the coefficient will be
larger or smaller than 1.00.
In addition to the criterion of similarity of
slopes, there is a second, minimal criterion.
When magnitude estimation scores are plotted
against each other on log-log paper, the line
joining the points should be straight. The
strength of the relationship is measured by a
product-moment correlation, and should be
near 1.00. This latter criterion refers to the
similarity of shapes in comparisons.
PERCEIVED CIRCUMSTANCES AND INFERENCES
OF INTENT
For those crimes where there is some con-
sensus about the undesirability of the act, cir-
cumstances are assumed to be important to
perceivers because they provide the basis for
inferring intent to the actor. Presumably, mak-
ing a judgement about the seriousness of a vi-
olative act would include the element of
whether the person intended to commit the act,
or whether it happened because the actor could
not prevent its occurrence.
Criminal law recognizes the importance of
perceived circumstances in emphasizing the
concept of mens rea or intent; it upholds the
principle that there is no crime unless there is
a concurrence of act and intent.' 0
Intent is, however, a subjective state; it is
inferred from immediate and existing circum-
stances in terms of a belief about what the
actor wanted to do. While the definition of in-
tent used in this study was developed by Hei-
der," it is similar to a legal concept of intent.
The legal concept of intent was not used be-
cause of the difficulties of specifying what
10 Marshall & Clark, The Legal Definitions of
Crime and Criminals, in THE SocIoLoaY OF C ium
AND DELINQUENCY 15 (M. Wolfgang, L. Savitz &
N. Johnston eds. 1970).
"1 F. HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPER-




is meant by intent in cases of criminal
negligence.12 According to Heider,23 when we
infer from circumstances why a person acted
as he did and why the act took a particular
form, the explanation comes to a stop when
the perceiver finds sufficient reason, i.e. when
an intention or motive is given that has the
quality of being reason enough. By contrast,
an impersonal scientific analysis engages in a
potentially infinite regress of cause and effect.
The proximate cause of the effect before us is
the effect of a more distant cause.
While persons are viewed by perceivers as
self-activating, self-energizing systems, it must
be recognized that actors may have identical
intent while manifesting wide variations in re-
sponses. Conversely, actors may manifest simi-
lar responses while having different types of
intent. Heider's theory attempted to explain
how perceivers find invariances of intent and
motive from the multiplicities of observed activ-
ity.
Drawing from Heiderian theory, Jones and
Davis' 4 proposed a theory of correspondent in-
ferences. The concept of correspondence can be
illustrated as follows. Suppose that we observe
A and B working together on a task. We note
that A gives orders to B, monitors his per-
formance, and shows his displeasure with the
quality and quantity of B's work. What we can
infer about A's intentions and disposition de-
pend upon the action alternatives we see as
available to A. If the situation were one in
which A and B were freely interacting, we
would conclude that A was quite arrogant and
domineering. On the other hand, if we were
informed that A had been given instructions to
assume a directive leadership role, we would
be less likely to regard his dominating behav-
ior as an indication of his personal qualities.
It is the former rather than the latter in-
stance which is high in correspondence; the
most correspondent inference is one that as-
sumes that domineering behavior is a direct re-
flection of the person's intention to dominate.
12 P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION
(1960).
13 HEIDER, mpra note 11.
14 Jones & Davis, Frmn Acts to Dispositio, in
2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 219 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as Jones & Davis].
Correspondence of inference declines as the ac-
tion to be explained is constrained by the set-
ting in which it occurs. To be able to infer in-
tent from the circumstances of the action, the
actor must be perceived as having choices
other than the one chosen. As it becomes more
difficult to infer other choices, it becomes more
difficult to infer intent.
Using the concept of correspondent infer-
ences, hypotheses were generated for eight fac-
tors in a 2x4 experimental design. While all
the results will be reported, only the hypothesis
using the factors of threat and reward will be
developed in this article.
The condition of threat would seem to pres-
ent fewer choices and greater constraints than
the condition of reward. Threatening the of-
fender with death or injury unless he commits
an offense places the emphasis on preventing
the individual from avoiding commission of the
offense. The implied assumption is that the in-
dividual does not want to commit the offense,
but threat closes off all reasonable choices
which avoid committing the offense. By con-
trast, rewarding the offender with money or a
job for committing the crime places an empha-
sis on reinforcement for the right choice.
Other choices may not be reinforced by the
person requesting the commission of the crime,
but they remain choices reinforceable in other
ways. Avoidance of the criminal act simply
leads to a lack of one kind of reinforcement. If
fewer constraints, and therefore greater, intent,
are perceived when the offender is rewarded,
in contrast to when the offender is threatened,
it is hypothesized that the same offenses will
be rated more seriously under conditions of
perceived reward in comparison to conditions
of perceived threat.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Two classes of variables were used to deter-
mine how seriousness scores would be modified
if the respondent were made aware of the cir-
cumstances of the offenses. The first set, envi-
ronmental constraints, are categories which
have in common some force or set of -forces
external to the offender which can induce him
to commit the offense. The four categories are
threat, victim precipitation, reward and':alien
control. A definition of each of these catego-
1975]
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ries was presented to every respondent as part
of the questionnaire.
Threat
Threat to the offender exists when other
groups or individuals tell the offender they
will physically injure or kill him unless he
commits the offense.
Victim Precipitation
Victim precipitation refers to circumstances
in which the victim created a set of oppor-
tunities for the offender to use in commit-
ting the offense. In offenses involving vio-
lence, the victim was the first to show a
deadly weapon. In offenses involving prop-
erty loss, the victim, for the first time, pre-
sented the offender with an opportunity to
commit the offense. For example, the victim
may, for the first time, leave his car un-
locked in a neighborhood where it may be
stolen.
Reward
Reward of the offender exists when other
groups or individuals tell the offender they
will pay him money or give him a better
job if he commits the offense.
Alien Control
Alien control of the offender refers to be-
havior which is induced by a foreign or ar-
tificial substance which leads to a compul-
sion or a reduction of inhibitions to the
point where the offender will commit the of-
fense.
A second class of variables, personal disposi-
tions, are categories which have in common
some forces or set of forces internal to the of-
fender which can induce him to commit the of-
fense. The two categories are hostile attitudes
and subcultural values. A definition of each of
these categories was presented to every re-
spondent as part of the questionnaire.
Hostile Attitude
Hostile attitude of the offender means that
he possesses a very intense and persistent
anger or aggression toward the victim. It is
accompanied by a period of planning de-
voted to ways of venting his anger on the
victim.
Subcultural Values
Subcultural values of the offender refer to
beliefs, ways of life, etc., which conflict with
those of the society at large. Because of his
membership in the subculture, these beliefs,
ways of life, etc., are considered "right" and
"good" by the offender and justify settling
injustices by means which ignore or oppose
the law.
The two classes of constraints, environmen-
tal constraints and personal dispositions, with
their attendant factors, were presented to 173
subjects using the 2x4 experimental design
diagrammed in Figure 1.
As Figure 1 indicates, the factors were ar-
ranged in such a manner so that each respond-
ent was presented with one factor from the
class of environmental constraints and one fac-
tor from the class of personal dispositions.
Six offenses were chosen from the 141 of-
fenses used by Sellin and Wolfgang.15 One set
of two offenses was concerned only with in-
jury to the victim, the second set had only a
component of theft, while the third set of two
offenses had differing amounts of damage. Not
only were offenses chosen which had either in-
jury, theft, or damage, but the amounts of each
in the set of two varied from small to large.
Thus, while the first offense resulted in death
to the victim, the second resulted only in
minor injury to the victim. Offenses were cho-
sen in this manner so that comparisons could
be made among ratings of injury, theft, and
damage if experimental stimuli altered the seri-
ousness scores. The offenses are given below
and listed by a number which is used through-
out the study.
1. The offender stabs a person to death.
2. The offender stabs a victim with a knife.
The victim is treated by a physician but
requires no further treatment.
3. The offender embezzles $1,OaO from his
employer.
4. The offender embezzles $5 from his em-
ployer.
5. The offender breaks into a locked car,
steals, damages and abandons it.
6. The offender breaks into a locked car and
later abandons it undamaged.
We used a control group for additional com-
parisons because it was extremely difficult to
devise stimulus situations which were identical
across all offenses. The study used volunteer
subjects from four colleges in the Philadelphia




EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS AND NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH CONDITION
Environmental Constraints
Threat Victim precipitation Reward Alien control
Personal dispositions
Hostile attitude .............. Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4
N =21 N =20 N=20 N =20
Subcultural values ........... Cell 5 Cell 6 Cell 7 Cell 8
N =20 N =20 N =32 N =20
area. For the experimental group, sixty subjects
came from the University of Pennsylvania,
ninety-five subjects from Drexel University,
thirty-five subjects from Villanova University
and sixteen from LaSalle College. The thirty-
three subjects in the control group were ob-
tained from Drexel University and the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. No claims for representa-
tiveness of the sample are made since different
strategies were used to obtain subjects ranging
from asking for volunteers to using entire so-
ciology classes in some schools.
We used two types of questionnaires in the
study. One type, given to the control group of
thirty-three subjects, consisted of six offenses
presented to the respondent in two random or-
ders. The instructions and format were identical
to those used by Sellin and Wolfgang in the
original study.
The second questionnaire, given to the ex-
perimental group, (N=173), consisted of the
same six offenses presented in two random or-
ders. For each of the six offenses rated by sub-
jects in the experimental group, a "case his-
tory" was given which described the
circumstances of the crime in a way which in-
cluded one category of environmental con-
straints and one category of personal disposi-
tions.
Subjects in the experimental group were
each given a questionnaire and a list of the
factor definitions. The subject was asked to
complete the section asking for sex, race, age,
year in college and major. The experimenter
then read the directions aloud while the sub-
jects followed on their copies. They were told
how to rate the factors of importance and the
seriousness of the events and were shown a
completed example.
After reading the event, and the circum-
stances surrounding the offense, the respond-
ents were asked to rate each factor as to its
importance in leading the offender to commit
the crime. The subjects were encouraged to
consult the list of definitions in deciding
whether the factor was "not important," "of
little importance," "somewhat important" or
"very important." After completing the rating
of factors, the respondents were asked to rate
the seriousness of offenses using instructions
provided by Sellin and Wolfgang. No subjects
refused to complete the questionnaire. Contrary
to instructions, two subjects used zero in rat-
ing the offenses; these scores were converted
to the smallest value given by any other re-
spondent for that offense. Eight other respond-
ents gave a score of infinity in rating an of-
fense. These scores were converted to the
largest score plus one given by any other re-
spondent for that offense.
Raw scores were converted to geometric
means for each offense and the appropriate
group, using the procedure followed by Akman
and Normandeaue in their Canadian replica-
tion study.
INDUCING INFERENCES OF INTENT FROM HE
PERCEIVED CIRCUMSTANCES
To determine to what extent subjects in the
eight cells of the experimental group believed
the factors were important in leading the of-
.6 Akrnan & Normandeau, Towards the Meas-
urement of Criminality inr Canada: A Replication
Study, 1 AcrA Ctriu. 135 (1968).
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fenders to commit the offenses, the four-step
rating scale was reduced to a dichotomy. A bi-
nomial test was computed for each of the di-
chotomized ratings.
If. .we had been successful in inducing the
subject to believe, after reading a case history
of the circumstances, that the factor had been
important in leading the offenders to commit
crimes, we would expect that the subject would
read the case history utilizing, for example,
"threat? and rate this factor as "very impor-
tant"" while other factors would be rated as
"not important."
The stated circumstances of the offenses
were "generally successful in inducing respond-
ents to rate factors as important or not impor-
tant. Cells 1 through 4, where hostile attitude
was combined with threat, victim precipitation,
reward, and alien control, tended to be a more
effective set of stimuli than subcultural values
in combination with threat, victim precipita-
tion, reward, and alien control. Hostile attitude
was always rated in the direction indicated in
Figure 1 for cell 1 through cell 4, but not cell
5 through cell 8. It seemed to be rated as an
important factor in leading the offender to
commit the crime whether it was present or
not in the stated circumstances of the offense.
Subcultural values was one of the weakest
factors. The respondents did not find it signifi-
cantly "not important" in offense #4 in cell
1, offenses #1, #2, #5 and #6 in cell 2, of-
fense #2 in cell 3, offenses #1, #2, #3, and
#5 in cell 4. Conversely, in cells 5 through 8,
where it was part of the circumstances of the
offense, subcultural values was rated as "very
important' in leading the offender to commit
the offense, according to the binomial tests, in
all cels except cell 6. However, except in cell
6, respondents rated hostile attitude as "very
important" also. Cell 6 showed very few sig-
nificant differences for either subcultural val-
ues or hostile attitude.
One possible interpretation of the results
found with subcultural values is that the re-
spondents required psychological variables as
mediating between behavior and values. In
other words, subcultural values would operate
through hostile attitude, threat, etc. This analy-
sis by.cultural levels explains the findings with
subcultural values and hostile attitude as well
as the frequent rating of it as "very impor-
tant" in other cells. To explore these varia-
tions in ratings of intent, the effect of collaps-
ing rows and columns and geometric means is
reported in the next section.
Support for the Jones and Davis'17 theory of
correspondent inferences was limited. Earlier
in this paper it was suggested that intent, in-
ferred from the circumstances of the crime,
would be easier to infer in the case of reward
in contrast to threat. While the difference is
small, the opposite seems to be the case; threat
was perceived to be "very important" 95 per
cent of the time, while reward was perceived
to be important 87 per cent of the time it was
present. Indeed, "threat" was one of the most
successful factors in the experiment. We did
not find any consistent differences among any
of the other factors.
The results indicate that within the limits of
experimental conditions, respondents seem to
be able to make inferences of intent utilizing
the circumstances of the offense. However, we
found little support for the Jones and Davis
theory specifying relative difficulty in inferring
different types of intent.
THE EFFEcT OF INFERENCES OF INTENTION
JUDGMENTS OF SERIOUSNESS
Geometric means were calculated for each of
the six offenses of each cell in the experimen-
tal group and the control group. (Table I).
To determine whether any of the experimen-
tal conditions had an effect on the geometric
means, we computed regression and correlation
coefficients and plotted geometric means on
log-log paper. Only the regression coefficients
(Table II) and correlation coefficients (Table
III) will be reported here.
If inferences of intent had an effect on
judgements of seriousness then both the re-
gression and correlation coefficients should dif-
fer from results posited by the scaling criteria.
As Table II indicates, the regression coefficients
are substantially different from the hypothes-
ized criteria of 1.00. However, examination of
Table III suggests that the seriousness index
meets the minimal criteria of correlation coef-
ficients near 1.00. With the exception of the
correlations of cell 3 with the other cells and




GEOMETRIC MEANS AND SAMPLE SIZE ON SIX OFFENSES FOR EIGHT
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS AND THE CONTROL GROUP
Offense Cell I Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6 Cell 7 Cell 8 Control
1 1968.45 1027.620 895.16 705.16 1763.40 325.03 894.26 2869.81 8552.68
2 194.22 64.46 559.47 96.35 71.81 54.93 216.37 108.42 672.50
3 24.78 25.48 27.60 33.25 28.13 30.45 30.42 38.40 28.82
4 4.51 8.35 8.48 6.21 5.13 7.74 11.89 6.01 4.97
5 26.98 20.68 24.48 26.71 24.73 24.63 36.60 33.11 41.64
6 8.61 10.74 12.57 8.85 7.27 12.67 16.98 12.03 16.31
N 21 20 20 20 20 20 32 20 33
TABLE II
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS ON SIX OFFENSES FOR EIGHT EXPERIMENTAL
CONDITIONS AND THE CONTROL GROUP
Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6 Cell 7 Cell 8 Control
Cell I ................... 1.92 1.79 2.84 1.11 5.47 2.24 .68 ,.23
Cell 2 ............ . .52 ........ .92 1.48 .58 2.85 1.16 .35 .12
Cell 3 ............ .42 .79 ........ 1.22 .45 2.33 1.02 .28 .10
Cell 4 ............ .35 .67 .64 ........ .39 1.92 .79 .24 .08
Cell 5 ............ .90 1.73 1.56 2.56 ........ 4.93 1.20 .61 .21
Cell 6 ............ .18 .35 .33 .52 .20 . ....... .41 .12 .04
Cell 7 ............ .44 .84 .85 1.25 .48 2.41 ........ .30 .10
Cell 8 ............ 1.47 2.82 2.55 4.17 1.63 8.03 3.26 ........ .34
Control .......... 4.38 8.40 7.79 12.44 4.84 23.94 9.76 2.97 . ......
the control group, the correlations range from
.98 to 1.00.
In general, there is little evidence to support
the hypothesis that inferences of intent alter
judgements of seriousness. With the exception
of offense #1 and offense #2 (injury offen-
ses), Table I indicates similar values for the
geometric means of the other four offenses.
Variations in the values of the geometric
means for the two injury offenses may reflect
the chance fluctuations due to computing
means on very small samples rather than the
effect of experimental stimulus. Because we
gathered information on the subjects' sex, age,
year in college, area of concentration and col-
lege attended, we were able to calculate geome-
tric means, regression and correlation coeffi-
cients for the possible categories of each
variable. While comparisons between catego-
ries met the minimal scaling criteria, the geo-
metric means of the six offenses exhibited a
pattern similar to that found in Table I. If the
experimental conditions were responsible for
the fluctuations in the geometric means of the
injury offenses, but not in the other offenses,
we should not expect the same pattern, when
the various background variables are exam-
ined.
Second, to determine the effect of sample
size on fluctuations of the geometric means, we
collapsed cell 1 through cell 4, and' cell 5
through cell 8 and calculated geometric means
for the first (N=81) and second (N=92)
row. For offense #1, the geometric means
were 1071.69 and 1105.44; for offense #2, the
geometric means were 161.58 and 108.74. The
regression coefficient for the two raw groups
was b=1.03 and the correlation coefficient was
.99. The reduced fluctuation in the geometric




PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATIONS FOR EIGHT EXPERIMENTAL
CONDITIONS AND CONTROL GROUP
Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6 Cell 7 Cell 8 Control
Cell I .................... 1.00 .87 1.00 1.00 1.00 .99 1.00 1.00
Cell 2 .......................... .85 1.00 1.00 1.00 .98 1.00 1.00
Cell 3 .................................... .88 .88 .88 .93 .84 .86
Cell 4 ........................................ 1.00 1.00 .99 1.00 1.00
Cell 5 ............................................... 1.00 .98 1.00 1.00
Cell 6 ....................................................... 99 1.00 1.00
Cell 7 ............................................................. .98 .99
Cell8 .................... ........ ............... ................ ........ 1.00
Control ................ ................... ...........................
geometric means were computed on a larger
group suggests that the size of the sample is
the relevant factor.
To determine whether increased sample size
may have an effect on the low correlations ob-
served in Table III, cells were combined as fol-
lows: cells 3 and 7 (reward), 1 and 5
(threat), 2 and 6 (victim precipitation), and 4
and 8 (alien control). Geometric means, re-
gression coefficients, and correlations were ob-
tained for each new category as well as for the
control group. For the reward condition, the
regression coefficients remain generally un-
changed while the range of correlations in-
creased to .92 to .97. This suggests that the
low correlations reported in Table III may have
been due to small sample size.
CONCLUSIONS
In an effort to determine how cognitive
processes entered into judgements of serious-
ness, the present study explored the effect of
differing perceived circumstances on judge-
ments of the seriousness of six offenses. Ac-
cording to Heider"' and Jones and Davis,19
perceived circumstances should lead to infer-
ences of the offender's criminal intent. We hy-
pothesized that the perceiver's willingness to
attribute intent to the offenders would change
across different experimental conditions and
that this, in turn, would affect the geometric
18 HEIDER, supra note 11.
'19 Jones & Davis, supra note 14.
means of the six offenses. Given these condi-
tions, it would be difficult to meet the scaling
criteria outlined by Sellin and Wolfgang.
The results indicate that while respondents
had little difficulty inferring intent from the
perceived circumstances, there was little sup-
port for the Jones and Davis theory that dif-
ferent circumstances would lead to a differen-
tial willingness to attribute intent.
Inferences of intent seem to have little effect
on seriousness judgements because the minimal
criteria of a similarity of shapes was met for
the experimental group. Fluctuations in the
geometric means and correlations seem to be
due to small sample size. While the ratios of
the score values rather than numerical similar-
ity in values is the important element in repli-
cation, the theft and damage offense means
show less fluctuation than the injury offense
means. College students may have less consen-
sus among themselves as to the seriousness of
injury and death to a victim in comparison to
theft or damage to property. The reason for
this difference in consensus is unclear.
Perhaps the most important conclusion of
this study is that perceivers assess the serious-
ness of criminal events in ways that make un-
important inferences of whether the offender
intended the act. This suggests that external
aspects of the event, such as the amount of in-
jury, theft, or damage is all the respondent
needs to make a reliable assessment of social
injury.
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